Embodied Cognition is a broad, interdisciplinary framework that challenges traditional cognitive science computationalist mind-as-computer by asserting that cognition is deeply shaped by the body and its interactions with the environment. Rather than cognition being just computation inside the brain, embodied approaches argue that the mind is constituted through dynamic, situated, and sensorimotor processes involving the whole organism.
The Foils and Inspirations for Embodied Cognition
Traditional computational cognitive science has been in play since the mid-Twentieth century, exploring language acquisition (Chomsky 1959), attention (Broadbent 1958), problem solving (Newell et al. 1958), attention, memory (Sternberg 1969), and perception (Marr 1982).
These utilized a computationalist approach: stimuli are encoded into symbols (a “mentalese”) which cognitive processes operate on using rules, and output linguistic utterances, a logic solution, a perception, etc.
However, there have been three prominent challenges to the computational model. These traditions inspired the rise of embodied cognition.
1.1 Ecological Psychology (J.J. Gibson)
Foil: Computationalism sees stimuli as “impoverished” (in the Chomskyan sense) and requiring inferential processing based on internal representations.
- e.g. Visual perception “inverse optics” problem: For any pattern of light on a retina, there exists an infinite number of possible distal surfaces capable of producing that pattern.
Ecological psychologists deny impoverished stimuli. For instance, visual perceptual processes involve the whole organism as it moves about its environment, with an object’s shape becoming apparent after detecting the transformation in the stimulus pattern.
“Insights like these have encouraged embodied cognition proponents to seek explanations of cognition that minimize or disavow entirely the role of inference and, hence, the need for computation.”
1.2 Connectionism
Foil: Classical cognitive science emphasized symbolic representations and rule-based processing.
Connectionism proposed cognition as non-symbolic (or sub-symbolic), distributed computation via patterns of activation (e.g. neural networks), rather than rule-based symbol manipulation.
Embodied cognition borrows this non-symbolic and distributed model for explaining cognitive processes. Additionally, the maths of dynamical systems theory complements connectionist models and can be extended to explain real-time body-environment coupling. Thus, some have argued dynamical systems offers the best framework to understand cognition.
1.3 Phenomenology
Foil: Cartesian dualism and internalist models treat mind and body as separate.
Phenomenology emphasizes that consciousness is embodied and world-involved. It rejects Cartesian-style mind/body dualisms as solipsistic introspection.
Phenomenologists Martin Heidegger (1975), Edmund Husserl (1929), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) inspire embodied cognition. Merleau-Ponty argues that consciousness is constituted by embodiment.
Phenomenological analysis reveals the Mind-Body Problem and Problem of Other Minds to be illusory. The problems are dissolved by acknowledging the lack of separation between mind, body, and world—including other people.
- Mind-Body Problem: How can mind arise from or interact with the physical body, especially the brain? How do we explain qualia in physical terms?
- Problem of Other Minds: How can I know that other people have minds like mine?
This phenomenological tradition deeply influences embodied cognition theories such as Shaun Gallagher (2005), Dan Zahavi (2005), and Evan Thompson (2010).